Democratization: China vs. Russia

Democratic trends within China and Russia provide great insight as to the prospects for global democratization. China, the most populous nation on earth, has experienced unprecedented growth in recent decades, accompanied by similar growth in regional and global influence. Russia has similarly experienced extensive economic growth; stabilizing the Russian economy and empowering the Kremlin, which has led to Russians re-asserting their role as a major player on the world stage. These factors, among many others, set Russia and China apart in terms of their potential impact upon future prospects of global democratization. The impact of a successful democracy in either of these two countries would set a historic precedent and would likely become something of a watershed event, especially when viewed in the light of the Cold War; whereas, a failure of democracy over the long term in either or both countries would more than likely present serious problems in the age of ever-accelerating globalization.

Through a comparative analysis of Russia and China this paper seeks to demonstrate that: successful democratic development is strongly rooted in the internal political disposition of a country; while at the same time its development can be either facilitated or hindered according to internal political culture and external political pressures. Understanding the dynamic produced by a country’s internal disposition and the external global environment is a complex affair and developing even marginally effective policy strategies to encourage democratization can at times seem futile. However, the competition between competing political systems is not a zero-sum game, and as such those who value democratic principles ought to take an active role in spreading its values. By way of an aggregation of the factors influencing and working against democratization in the two countries, this paper will attempt to demonstrate that future prospects for democratization are riddled with uncertainties. Nevertheless, a world composed of nations rooted in democracy and rule of law provide the best viable framework for positively shaping the world and as such should not be abandoned.

In order to evaluate the democratic tendencies within China and Russia it is important to define what exactly the word “democracy” is meant to describe. According to Bernard Crick, “‘Democracy’ may be a promiscuous and often purely rhetorical word and certainly not a single value embracing or overriding all other values in all circumstances.[1] Within this paper democracy will be treated as system in which “all [citizens] can participate [in government] if they care (and care they should), but they must then mutually respect the equal rights of fellow citizens within a regulatory legal order that defines, protects, and limits those rights.”[2] In other words a conception of democracy rooted in a dualism between: meaningful citizen participation in decision making, largely manifested in the various types of representative democracy; and the provision of liberty to all individuals to the extent that a equilibrium of liberty is achieved, which will theoretically result in a maximization of liberty for each individual. Naturally such a simple conception of democracy is somewhat utopian and purely theoretical. However, it provides a decent framework from which a comparison of elements within the Russian and Chinese polities that either hinder or promote the liberal and lawful tendencies necessary for democracy.

What than is needed within a society to move toward the idealized form of democracy? Larry Diamond, in a recent essay decrying the “resurgence of the predatory state”, has identified much of what is missing and must be corrected in infant democracies that are at risk of reverting to, or have already reverted to autocracy.[3] The following are elements which act to hinder democracy and will be discussed in the context of Russia and China: unchecked executive power;[4] and political domination by elites, something which typically leads to “corrupt and unresponsive systems.”[5] The following factors, favorable to democratization, will also be evaluated in each case: institutions designed to “induce, enforce, and reward civic behavior”;[6] vertical accountability, as manifest in “dense, vigorous civil societies, with independent organizations, mass media, think tanks,…networks that foster civic norms, pursue the public interest, raise citizen consciousness, break the bonds of clientelism, scrutinize [the government], and lobby for good-governance reforms.”;[7] and finally horizontal accountability as manifest in counter corruption and parliamentary oversight committees that are backed by the force of law and comprised of educated professions.[8] Further to this, a review of the external factors involved in democratization within the two countries will be addressed; emphasizing the impact of economic and geographic factors.

Political control within China is concentrated within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); effectively resulting in an elite dominated system. According to Diamond reforms to such a system can only be achieved by “the internal democratization of political parties through the improvement of their transparency and accessibility and the strengthening of other representative bodies.”[9] Interestingly there is evidence that China is in the early phases of internal reform to the CPP. President Hu Jintao for instance referred to democracy as “the common pursuit of mankind” during his 2006 address to the United Nations.[10] In 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao proclaimed that “developing democracy and improving the legal system are basic requirements of the socialist system.” [11] The CPP’s new pro-democracy talking points are encouraging; however, previous Chinese leaders have evoked “democracy” and gone on to pursue highly undemocratic policy. Most notably, when Mao, advocated a “new democracy” in which the CCP would implement a “democratic dictatorship”; though Mao succeeded only in creating a cult of personality, as well as disastrous experiments in social engineering.[12]

Though the democracy presented by today’s CCP leadership appear to have come to a more pragmatic view of democracy and its implementation. Democratization is being treated as something which must occur gradually, perhaps taking a cue from the problems Russia faced following the Soviet Union’s collapse due to glasnost and perestroika. According to the economist John L. Thornton “senior Chinese leaders do not welcome the latitude of freedom of speech, press or assembly taken for granted in the West. They say they support the orderly expansion of these rights but focus more on the group and social harmony-what they consider the common good.” Whereas those lower on the hierarchy, who are not coached in official CCP talking points, are uncertain as whether the democracy will follow a “guided” path or follow the “standard liberal democratic model”.[13][14] Whatever the end-result of the current CCP policy, potential Chinese democratic development ought to be encouraged by the West. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the West does not have a monopoly on ideas-still continuing to unashamedly pursue our interests insofar as political, cultural and economic factors are concerned-and encouraging a dialogue between East and West as to how mankind as a whole can best organize the, so-called, “flat world”.

The political leadership situation in Russia is rather dismal when compared to China’s. Comparing this facet of the two polities requires not so much a review of their “statistical rankings”; rather an analysis of their respective historic democratic trajectories is likely more fruitful. China, as previously discussed, has arguably demonstrated marked improvements toward liberalism over the last two decades. Whereas Russia, since the collapse of the Soviet empire, has faced economic turmoil and political impotence during the 90s; following which time Vladimir Putin came to power and was poised to preside over a new boom in the energy market. His conduct and administration of Russia during this time appears to appeal to base notions of nationalism and has consolidated power into the executive branch. Moreover he has weakened the potential checks on the executive by the other branches or civic institutions; the detrimental effects of such policy are abundantly clear in the following case study.

Tsypkin, in his analysis Russian intelligence services, observes that “Putin himself ‘coordinates’ the work of [all] the [intelligence] agencies.”[15] The difficulty in such an arrangement, beyond the excessive powers embodied in the Putin’s office, is the lack of transparency. Legislative oversight of the Federal Security Services (FSS), one of several agencies born out of the splitting up of the KGB, did not exist up until 2005.[16] Since establishing a parliamentary committee in 2005 little has changed, as over two-thirds of its members are former officers of the FSB, KGB, or another intelligence agency.[17]
Consequently Putin, a former KGB officer himself, is provided with ample breathing room to conduct all kinds of potentially nefarious and clandestine operations. The obstacles to democratization caused by the failure of Putin and past post-Soviet administrations to effectively demonstrate a break with the KGB past are problematic, as explained by Tsypkin:

The high degree of continuity between the Soviet-era agencies and their Russian successors makes the legacy of the Soviet intelligence and security services-bodies that carried out one of the twentieth century’s worst campaigns of mass state terror-crucial for this discussion. The Soviet political leadership always exercised civilian control of a very narrow kind over the intelligence and security apparatus: Joseph Stalin controlled it singlehandedly, while his successors did the same in a more collegial fashion, but throughout their history these agencies operated in complete secrecy and, unconstrained by legality or publicity, answered to no one save top political leaders. The responsibilities of these agencies were extremely broad: from the traditional missions of intelligence and counterintelligence, to the regime’s political security, to control of all forms of self-expression, and, under Stalin, even to the design and development of weapons.[18]

While Putin’s actions are largely perceived as being despotic, some argue that the consolidation of power into a strong executive is in fact a necessary step on the path toward democracy. Russian author Dmitri Trenin for instance points out that Putin has presided over “eight years of steady economic growth”.[19] Trenin readily admits that the economic boom has been driven largely by high energy prices, but goes on to argue that Putin’s policies during the boom have helped create a middle-class, a group of people who eventually will demand “rule of law.”[20] In terms of identifying the creation of a middle-class as a necessary boon for democratization, Trenin is in good company. Over two millennia ago Aristotle identified the value in “the mean” as well:

The best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered in which the middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. [21]

Such assessments crediting Putin’s with expanding the middle class may in the end prove accurate. Furthermore Putin’s most recent decision not to seek an amendment to the constitution to allow for his continuing on as Russia’s president beyond the two term limit is a good sign; especially considering his insurmountable popularity among the Russian citizenry.[22] Though even in this instance Putin’s apparent adherence to the constitution may in fact be a shrewd political calculation, as he may be empowering the Prime Minister’s offices with new powers; an office which he is slated to hold as per his instructions to his hand-chosen presidential successor, Dmitry Medvedev.[23] Through such maneuvering Putin may have simply bypassed the constitution to avoid tarnishing Russia’s reputation, all the while remaining the de facto Czar.

Potential future democratic developments within China aside; today’s China continues to rank among the lowest in the world in terms of freedom and human rights. A recent “Freedom House” report ranks China as 71st out of 176 countries in terms of political rights and civil liberties.[24] Western governments, institutions and citizens ought not to feel obliged to ignore the very worst of China’s abuses based solely on account of the CPP’s admonishing us to patience based on their plan for “gradual democratization”. It is important to hold the Chinese leaders accountable to what they say, particularly for those in positions of influence who enjoy the luxury of free speech; as the risks associated with speaking out for the ordinary Chinese is to risk facing the full force of a police state. This truth is known all too well by individuals like Hu Jia, a Chinese AIDS awareness activist and prisoner of conscience, facing up to three and a half years in prison for what amounts to “thought crimes”.[25][26] Given the oppressive nature of China’s policy toward Tibetan nationalists and their religion, the Chinese violence must not be condoned. However, the West ought to take this opportunity to implore the moderate factions of the CPP to take a stand against such a crackdown, and provide conditions for the ethnic Tibetans to form vertical civil institutions. It seems unlikely that the moderate voices will win out in this discussion, given Chinese response to Olympic protests, though similar agitation will help keep the pressure on the Chinese to further democratize.[27] The upcoming, highly anticipated, Summer Olympic games in China presents potential opportunities and risks in encouraging Chinese reform to policy. For instance Newsweek reported in late March that the recent protests in Tibet have led a violent nationalist driven crackdown by Chinese police.

Russian civil institutions are in many ways not unlike China’s, especially in terms of the state domination of mass media outlets.[28] Western media outlets have likewise criticized the Russian government for human rights abuses. The Putin administration’s undemocratic policy toward constraining freedom of the press in particular has been highly criticized.[29]

However, there is a key difference between the two, that being the electoral systems of the two countries. While China has a limited electoral system, relegated to the rural population and small local municipalities;[30] the Russia Federation was designed to allow for civic participation, through regular federal and regional elections.[31] However, Putin in keeping with his concentrating power within the Presidency has taken steps to render the Federated system ineffective, as described by Stoner-Weiss in the following excerpt:

February 2006 marks the first anniversary of Russia’s clear turn away from democracy. The key event was the enactment, in early 2005, of a law abolishing the popular election of governors in Russia’s 89 provinces. This formal rejection of the electoral principle came after four years of steadily growing limitations on democracy under President Vladimir Putin, years that had seen a narrowing of the freedoms to speak and publish, to associate, and to be immune from arbitrary searches and seizures. But the actual elimination of 89 elective offices was a definitive step off the path of democratic consolidation.[32]

Stoner-Weiss goes on to debunk Putin’s supposed justifications for his policy, citing that he proceeded to leave the majority of the “purportedly corrupt governors” in their office.[33] In a more recent analysis by Stoner-Weiss and McFaul, they note that the reversion to autocracy has increased to the extent that “many of Putin’s defenders, including some Kremlin officials, have given up the pretense of characterizing Russia as a ‘managed’ or ‘sovereign’ democracy. Instead, they contend that Russia’s democratic retreat has enhanced the state’s ability to provide for its citizens.”[34] The authors go on to question the legitimacy of such a claim:

Is it right to think, as Putin apparently does, that autocracies tend to govern better than democracies? In 1968, Samuel P. Huntington wrote approvingly of the Soviet state’s ability to govern its vast domain.1 A little more than two decades later, however, that state would lie in ruins, hollowed out to the point of collapse by decades of progressive exhaustion. Left behind to sift through the debris was a population sunk in poverty and beleaguered by numerous social and economic ills. Whatever else it may have been, Sovietism was obviously not a successful development model.

Advancing the argument further, Stoner-Weiss and McFaul rightly identify that “capitalist democracies have proven more enduring…relying on bureaucratic and organizational (infrastructural capacity rather than force to ensure the allegiance of their populations… states that rely heavily on force (or despotic power) but which lack significant infrastructural supports are by nature precarious.” In light of such analysis, it reasonable to conclude that Russia’s move back to autocracy has in many ways lowered its democratic achievements relative to China to the extent that China may be positioned for real democratic change in the future; while Russia will need either to continue down the path of autocracy or have to face the prospects of correcting the mistakes of the Putin regime. For these reasons an argument advocating conservative and gradual democratization is perhaps best suited for democratization in authoritarian nations like China and Russia. Though before solid conclusions can be drawn, further examination of the economy ought to be taken into account.

China’s double digit economic growth in recent decades is unparalleled in world history, leading many to conclude China will overtake the West as the dominant world power. [35] Given their poor record the historian Neil Ferguson for instance has stated that the 20th century was “the descent of the West and a reorientation of the world toward the East”.[36] Others such as political scholar John Ikenberry contend that while the USA itself may be overtaken by China, Western civilization as a whole is poised to remain the most dominant force in the globe for the better part of the next century. [37] Moreover, if global institutions such as the WTO, the OECD, and the UN are strengthened and kept open, the peaceful rise of China could prove a boon to humanity as a whole.[38] These global institutions, established in the post WWII era, are predicated on notions of openness and rule of law.

Unlike the imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating conditions for rising states to advance their expanding economic widely in terms of whether the material benefits that are generated accrue disproportionately to the leading state or are widely shared. In the Western system, the barriers to economic participation are low, and the potential benefits are high. China has already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system.[39]

Ikenberry goes on to conclude that China’s current economic productive mode will inevitably necessitate its joining the so-called “liberal order”. [40] Though China’s willingness to embrace such institutions have yet to be fully realized, as expressed in a report from US policy makers:

Political liberalization and respect for human rights in China has lagged behind expectations and what the Chinese people themselves deserve. Successive U.S. administrations have argued that maintaining normal relations with China would promote both economic and political reforms there. This sentiment was clearly articulated by President George W. Bush’s future national security adviser and secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, in February 2000: ‘‘. . . trade in general can open up the Chinese economy and, ultimately, its politics too. This view requires faith in the power of markets and economic freedom to drive political change, but it is a faith confirmed by experiences around the globe.”[41]

It is likely that China’s pace in reform will not perfectly meet the West’s preferred timeframe; arguably, they should also be given leeway based on their sheer size, a country comprised of more than a billion people will inevitably face many barriers to stable reform. Though a thorough analysis of China’s current policy demonstrates that the chances of its democratizing are significant.

Unlike China, Russia economic mode of production is not at this time in a position to easily integrate into the world economic order. While perhaps not officially an “oil rentier state”, Russia in shares many of its failings. According to Sandbakken, oil rentier states:

Have specific features that make them unlikely to become consolidated democracies. It narrows down the rentier state framework to three such features: first, that rentier states do not rely on taxation for income and thus are released from democratic obligations to their taxpayers; second, that the state spends oil revenues on placating and repressing its population; and third, that the social structure in rentier states leaves very little room for democratic opposition.[42]

Early in Putin’s regime revenue from oil enabled his administration to reinvigorate the ineffective bureaucracy of the Russian state. Yet at the same time Putin has stifled democratic institutions, as discussed previously, and also established dangerous precedents for Russia’s ultimate sustainability. This is particularly so given that the boom is fueled by conventional energy revenues, which is infamous for its extreme volatility.

The passage of time will be the ultimately arbiter as to the ultimate success or failure of either country to achieve stable democratic forms. It is also important to recognize, as with any comparative analysis in the social sciences, there is no “one size fits all”; the most that can be achieved is a delineation of social trends and patterns. Such knowledge can be put to purposeful use however. By informing policy makers as to what they may want to be aware of when they are forced to make decisions on uncertain issues. Moreover, in the case of this particular comparison, it enables active and engaged citizens to come to grips with the state of things in the world; and it is within such understanding that citizens are empowered to effectively participate in the global polity.

Work in progress …. Comments & Critiques Wanted!

NOTES

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[1]Bernard Crick, Democracy : A Very Short Introduction, Very Short Introductions (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.11

[2]Ibid., p.13

[3] Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008):

[4] Ibid.:p.38.

[5] Ibid.:p.47.

[6] Ibid.:pp.43-44.

[7] Ibid.:p.44.

[8] Ibid.:pp.43-44.

[9] Ibid.:p.47.

[10] John L. Thornton, “Long Time Coming. (Cover Story),” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008):p.3.

[11] Ibid.:pp.2-3.

[12] Ibid.:

[13] Ibid.:p.4.

[14] Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat : A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, 1st further updated and expanded hardcover ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007),

[15] Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russia’s Failure,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (2006):pp.72-74.

[16] Ibid.:p.76.

[17] Ibid.:pp.73-76.

[18] Ibid.:p.73.

[19] Dmitri Trenin, “Two Forward, One Back”. Newsweek.com, 2008. http://www.newsweek.com/id/117811/output/print (11 April 2008)

[20] Ibid.

[21] Aristotle. “Politics: Book Iv.” Place Published: The Internet Classics Archive, 2007. “http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.4.four.html” (20 March 2008): chapter XI.

[22] Victor Yasman and Donald Jensen, “Putin’s Choice: A Profile of Dmitry Medvedev”. Radio Free Europe (Online ed.), 2008. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/3/65F30DE2-1E60-4107-949A-E643E5132E87.html (12 April 2008)

[23] Guy Faulconbridge, “Russia May Boost Pm’s Powers in Regions”. The Washington Post (Online ed.), 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/10/AR2008041000310_pf.html (11 April 2008)

[24] Author Unkown, “China: Online Country Report”. Freedom House, 2008. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7155&year=2007 (10 April 2008)

[25] Author Unkown, “Hu Jia Jailed for Three and a Half Years”. Amnesty International Online, 2008. http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/chinese-activist-gets-jail-sentence-20080403 (04 April 2008)

[26] Melinda Liu, “China’s Dangerous Game”. Newsweek.com, 2008. http://www.newsweek.com/id/129615/output/print (April 10, 2008)

[27] Jane McCartney, “Chinese Media Provokes Outrage over Pro-Tibet Olympics Protests – Times Online”. Times Online UK, 2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/olympics/article3732204.ece (12 April 2008)

[28] Author Unkown, “Russia: Online Country Report “. Freedom House, 2008. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=406&year=2006 (10 April 2008);

Ashley Esarey. “Mass Media Control in Contemporary China.” In Freedom House Special Report:Freedom House, 2006. “http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/33.pdf” (01 April 2008)

[29] Chloe Arnold, “Russia: Ex-Kremlin Journalist Talks from U.K. Asylum”. Radio Free Europe (Online ed.), 2008. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/04/22035904-7986-4176-b919-23f062624f9d.html (08 April 2008);

Chloe Arnold, “Russia: Daghestani Decree May Spell Curtains for Play Recalling Dubrovka Tragedy”. Radio Free Europe (Online ed.), 2008. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/04/f4d4723c-eada-40b7-a387-c3c42c46a513.html (12 April 2008)

[30] CIA, “China”. The World Fact Book (CIA), 2008. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (04 April 2008)

[31] —, “Russia”. The World Fact Book (CIA), 2008. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html (04 April 2008)

[32] Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Russia: Authoritarianism without Authority,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 1 (2006):p.104.

[33] Ibid.:pp.104-05.

[34] Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008):pp.73-74.

[35] Author Unkown, “China”. The World Fact Book (CIA), 2008. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (04 April 2008)

[36] Neil Ferguson: as cited in Ikenberry, G. John. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive.”Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): p.23.

[37] G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008):pp.23-37.

[38] Ibid.:

[39] Ibid.:

[40] Ibid.:

[41] J. Edwards and J. Kemp. “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do.” In Independent Task Force Report Ser., 2006. pp., 5-6

[42] Camilla Sandbakken, “The Limits to Democracy Posed by Oil Rentier States: The Cases of Algeria, Nigeria and Libya,” Democratization 13, no. 1 (2006):p.135.

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